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Abstract
We study how network structure affects the dynamics of collateral in presence of rehypoth-
ecation. We build a simple model wherein banks interact via chains of repo contracts and
use their proprietary collateral or re-use the collateral obtained by other banks via reverse
repos. In this framework, we show that total collateral volume and its velocity are affected
by characteristics of the network like the length of rehypothecation chains, the presence or
not of chains having a cyclic structure, the direction of collateral flows, the density of the
network. In addition, we show that structures where collateral flows are concentrated among
few nodes (like in core-periphery networks) allow large increases in collateral volumes already
with small network density. Furthermore, we introduce in the model collateral hoarding rates
determined according to a Value-at-Risk (VaR) criterion, and we then study the emergence
of collateral hoarding cascades in different networks. Our results highlight that network
structures with highly concentrated collateral flows are also more exposed to large collateral
hoarding cascades following local shocks. These networks are therefore characterized by a
trade-off between liquidity and systemic risk.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the collateral dynamics when banks are connected in a network of finan-
cial contracts and they have the ability to rehypothecate the collateral along chains of contracts.
Collateral is of increasing importance for the functioning of the global financial system. One
reason for this is that the non-bank/bank nexus has become considerably more complex over the
past two decades, in part because the separation between hedge funds, mutual funds, insurance
companies, banks, and broker/dealers has become blurred as a result of financial innovation and
deregulation (Singh, 2016; Pozsar and Singh, 2011). Another reason for the significant increase
in collateral volumes (comparable to M2 until the recent financial crisis, see e.g. Singh, 2011) has
been the diffusion of rehypothecation agreements. The role of collateral in lending agreements is
to protect the lender against a borrower’s default. Rehypothecation1 consists in the right of the
lender to re-use the collateral to secure another transaction in the future (see Monnet, 2011).
Rehypothecation of collateral has clear advantages for liquidity in modern financial systems
(see Financial Stability Board, 2017b). In particular, it allows parties to increase the availabil-
ity of assets to secure their loans, since a given pool of collateral can be re-used to support
different financial transactions. As a result, rehypothecation increases the funding liquidity of
agents (see Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). At the same time, rehypothecation also implies
risks for market players. First, one risk associated with the additional funding liquidity al-
lowed by rehypothecation can be the building-up of excessive leverage in the market (see e.g.
Bottazzi et al., 2012; Singh, 2012; Capel and Levels, 2014). Second, rehypothecation implies
that several agents are counting on the same set of collateral to secure their transactions. It
follows that rehypothecation may represent yet another channel through which agents’ balance
sheets become interlocked2, and thus a source of distress propagation and of systemic risk. For
instance in the face of idiosyncratic shocks, some institutions may start to precautionarily hoard
collateral, which in turn constrains the availability of collateral and its re-use for the down-
stream institutions in chains of repledges. This may consequently lead to an inefficient market
freeze if participants lack the necessary assets to secure their loans (Leitner, 2011; Monnet, 2011;
Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The latter is the distress channel we focus on in this paper.
To analyze economic benefits and systemic consequences of rehypothecation, we develop a
model of collateral dynamics over a network of repurchase agreements (repos) across banks. To
keep the model as simple as possible we abstract from many features of markets with collateral,
and we assume that the amount of collateral available for repo financing is set as a constant
fraction of total collateral available to each agent. The latter includes the proprietary collateral
1Throughout this paper, the terms “re-use”, “rehypothecation”, and “re-pledge” are interchangeable.
2See for Battiston et al. (2016) for an account of the sources of banks’ interconnectedness in financial systems.
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endowment of each bank as well as the collateral obtained from other banks via reverse repos.
Although simple, our model allows us to highlight what features of rephypothecation network
topology determine (i) the overall volume of collateral in the market, and (ii) the velocity of
collateral (Singh, 2011). We show that both variables are an increasing function of the length of
open chains. However, for a given length, cyclic chains (i.e. those where banks are organized in
a closed chain of repo contracts) produce higher collateral than a-cyclic chains. Furthermore, we
show that the direction of collateral flows also matters. In particular, concentrating collateral
flows among few nodes organized in a cyclic chain allows large increases in collateral volume
and in velocity even with small chains’ length. Finally, we investigate total collateral under
some typical network architectures, which capture different modes of organization of financial
relations in markets, and in particular different degrees of heterogeneity in the distribution of
repo contracts and of collateral flows. We show that total collateral is an increasing function of
the density of financial contracts both in the random network (where heterogeneity is mild) and
in the core-periphery network (where heterogeneity is high). However, core-periphery structures
allow for a faster increase in collateral.
The above-explained model with exogenous levels of collateral hoarding rates is useful to
analyse the effects of network topology on collateral flows. At the same time it is unfit to
study the systemic risk implications of rehypothecation as hoarding behaviour could also reflect
the liquidity position of agents in the network. We thus extend the basic model, to introduce
hoarding behaviour that accounts for liquidity risk. More precisely, we assume that hoarding
rates are set according to a Value-at-Risk (VaR) criterion, aimed at minimizing liquidity default
risk. In this framework, we show that the equilibrium hoarding rate of each bank is a function
of the hoarding rates and the collateral levels of the banks at which it is directly and indirectly
connected. This introduces important collateral hoarding externalities in the dynamics, as an
increase in hoarding at some banks may indirectly cause higher hoarding at other banks even
not directly connected to it. We then use the extended model to study the impact on total
collateral losses of small uncertainty shocks hitting a fraction of banks in the network, and
how those losses vary with the structure of the rehypothecation networks. We show that core-
periphery structures are the most exposed to large collateral losses when shocks hit the central
nodes in the network, i.e. the one concentrating collateral flows. As, core-periphery are also the
structures that generate larger collateral volumes, our results highlight that these structures are
characterized by a trade-off between liquidity and systemic risk.
Our work contributes to the recent theoretical literature on the consequences of collateral
rehypothecation (see e.g. Bottazzi et al., 2012; Andolfatto et al., 2017; Gottardi et al., 2017;
Singh, 2016). This literature has highlighted the role of rehypothecation in determining repo
rates (e.g. Bottazzi et al., 2012), or in softening borrowing constraints of market participants
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and in shaping the interactions in repo markets (Gottardi et al., 2017; Andolfatto et al., 2017)
or, finally, it has contributed to evaluate some welfare aspects of policies aimed at regulating
rehypotheaction (Andolfatto et al., 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is
the first to study the role of the structure of the network of collateral exchanges and to explore
how different network structures determine overall collateral volumes and velocity. Furthermore,
our work contributes also to the literature on liquidity hoarding cascades, and it is particular
related to the work of Gai et al. (2011). However, different from this work, our model introduces
hoarding rates that are responsive to the liquidity position of the single bank and to the position
occupied in the network. In addition, it shows that liquidity hoarding dynamics can have quite
different consequences depending on the particular structure of the network.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic definitions used throughout
the paper and the model with fixed hoarding rates. Section 3 studies in detail how the structure
of rehypothecation networks determines collateral volume and its velocity. Next, Section 4 ex-
tends the model to feature time-varyng hoarding rates determined according to a VaR criterion.
Section 5 uses the latter model to study collateral hoarding cascades in different rehypothecation
networks. Finally, Section 6 concludes, also by discussing some implications of our work.
2 A model of collateral dynamics on networks
In this section we build the network model that we then use the analyse the ability of the
financial system to generate endogenous collateral in presence of rehypothecation and, next,
to study the dynamics of collateral hoarding cascades in presence of shocks. We start with
basic definitions that we shall use throughout the paper. We then introduce the laws governing
collateral dynamics in presence of rehypothecation and of fixed hoarding coefficients by banks.
2.1 Definitions
Consider a set of N financial institutions (“banks” for brevity in the following). Banks invest
into an external asset, that yields an exogenously fixed return rEA, and that can also be used
as a collateral. In, addition they lend to each other by using only secured loans that involve
exchange of collateral as in Singh (2011).3 More precisely, we assume that all debt contracts
are “repo” contracts, they are thus secured by collateral. A “repo” or “repurchase agreement”,
is the sale of securities together with an agreement for the seller to buy back the securities at
a later date.4 A “reverse repo” is the same contract from the point of view of the buyer. The
3See also Aguiar et al. (2016) for a more comprehensive discussion of the structure of collateral flows.
4The repurchase price should be greater than the original sale price, the difference effectively representing
interest, and sometimes called the repo rate.
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haircut rate of a repo, that we denote as h , is a percentage that is subtracted from the market
value of an asset that is being used in a repo transaction.5 To collect funds via repo contracts
each bank i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) can use the collateral that has in its “box”. The box includes both
the proprietary collateral or the collateral obtained via reverse-repos, which can then be re-
pledged or rehypothecated for further repo transations. Repo transactions among banks using
proprietary and non-properietary collateral give rise to a directed network G, that we shall label
“rehypothecation network”. To explain in details the dynamics of collateral in each bank’s box
and the timing of the events occurring through the network G it is useful to define the following
notations:
• ACouti : the total amount of collateral flowing out of bank i’s box at each step, i.e. the total
amount of collateral that the bank i uses to obtain loans from other banks.
• ACrmi : the total amount of (re-pledgeable) collateral remaining inside the box.
• ACi : the total amount of (pledgeable) collateral flowing into the box of the bank i. At
every step, the collateral that flows into the box must equal the collateral that remains in
the box plus the collateral that flows out of the box. Hence, we have ACi = A
Cout
i +A
Crm
i .
Notice that ACi includes both proprietary as well as non-proprietary assets received from
other banks.
• A0i : the value of the proprietary collateral of the bank i. This means the bank i is the
original owner of A0i .
• Bi: the borrowers’ set of bank i, i.e. the banks that obtained funding from i via repos
and thus provided collateral to i. In the rehypothecation network, Bi is also the “in-
neighborhood” of i.
• Li: the lenders’ set of bank i, i.e. the banks that obtained collateral from i and thus
provided funding to i. In the rehypothecation network, Li is also the “out-neighborhood”
of i.
• Unless specified otherwise, each of the above mentioned symbols written without indices
denotes the vector of the same variable for all the banks in the system, for instance
AC = [AC1 , A
C
2 , ...A
C
i , ...A
C
N ], and similarly for the other quantities.
Furthermore, let the variable ai←j capture the direction of collateral flow from the bank j to
the bank i. In particular, for every pair of banks i and j, ai←j = 1 if bank j has given collateral
to bank i and ai←j = 0 otherwise. Two additional variables related to the direction of collateral
5The size of the haircut usually reflects the perceived risk associated with holding the asset.
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flows are the “out-degree” of a bank i, kouti , which measures the total number of outgoing links
of the bank, and thus the number of banks to whom bank i provided collateral to. Likewise, the
“in-degree” of a bank i, kini , is the total number of banks that provided collateral to i.
Finally, we assume that each bank hoards a fraction 1− θi of the collateral it has in the box.
More precisely, for every monetary unit of collateral, the bank i will keep (1− θi) inside its box
and give away θi. Moreover, to keep the model simple we assume that each bank homogeneously
spreads its non-hoarded collateral across its lenders. Let si←j be the share of bank j’s outgoing
collateral flowing into the box of the bank i. If Lj = ∅ (i.e. k
out
j = 0), then all shares si←j
are equal to zero. If the lender’s set is not void, Lj 6= ∅, that is if koutj > 0, then for the total
outgoing collateral pledged or re-pledged by bank j, AC
out
j it holds:
AC
out
j =
∑
i∈Lj
si←jA
Cout
j ,
since the shares si←j satisfy the constraint
∑
i∈Lj
si←j = 1. Notice, that this means that each
non-zero column of the matrix of shares S = {si←j}NxN associated with the network G is
summing to 1. In addition, recall that collateral is spread homogenously across lenders. This
implies that
sj =
1
koutj
.
and that the elements of the matrix S can be expressed as


si←j =
ai←j
koutj
, if koutj > 0,
si←j = 0, otherwise.
(1)
2.2 Collateral dynamics
To describe collateral dynamics in our model let us assume, in line with Bottazzi et al. (2012)
that the amount of collateral that can be re-hypothecated never exceeds the haircutted amount
of collateral. Furthermore, let us assume for simplicity that the haircut rate h ∈ [0, 1] is the
same for all banks. On these grounds, we can write the following expression for the dynamics
of AC
out
i , the total amount collateral flowing out of the box of the bank i:
AC
out
i = A
0out
i + (1− h)δiθi
∑
j∈Bi
si←jA
Cout
j , (2)
where A0
out
i = δiθiA
0
i is the proprietary amount of outgoing collateral of the bank i. The
parameter θi accounts for the fraction that is not hoarded. The second term of the equation
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captures the amount of collateral received by i from its borrowers j and that is re-pledged.
Notice that bank i can only re-pledge a fraction (1 − h)θi of what it receives, where (1 − h)
accounts for the fraction remaining after the haircut is applied, and θi accounts for what is not
hoarded. Finally, δi is an indicator equal to one if bank i engages in at least one repo contract
so that its out-degree is positive and equal to zero otherwise (i.e δi = 1, if k
out
i > 0, and zero
otherwise).
Similarly, the dynamics of the total amount of re-pledgeable collateral remaining inside the
box of the bank i is described by the following equation
AC
rm
i = A
0rm
i + (1− h)(1 − δiθi)
∑
j∈Bi
si←jA
Cout
j , (3)
where A0
rm
i = A
0
i −A0
out
i = (1− δiθi)A0i is the initial remaining collateral.
Uses and re-use of collateral in our model are fully described by the recursive process explained
by the above two equations. Notice that both Equation (2) and (3) imply that at the initial
step every bank i gives away A0
out
i of collateral to its outgoing neighbors and keeps A
0rm
i inside
its box. In addition, for an amount of si←jA
Cout
j that the bank i receives from a neighbour j,
it re-pledges (1 − h)δiθisi←jACoutj and hoards an amount [1 − (1 − h)δiθi]si←jAC
out
j . However,
only the amount (1− h)(1− δiθi)si←jACoutj of this hoarded collateral is further re-pledgeable to
obtain further funding later, because the haircutted amount of collateral, hsi←jA
Cout
j , is kept in
a segregated account that can be only accessed in the case of a credit event (see Bottazzi et al.,
2012, for details).
We can also determine the expression of total amount of re-pledgeable collateral flowing into
the box of each bank i:
ACi = A
Cout
i +A
Crm
i = A
0
i + (1− h)
∑
j∈Bi
si←jA
Cout
j . (4)
The last equation makes clear that the total collateral flow in the box of a bank, ACi in-
cludes the proprietary assets (i.e. A0i ) as well as re-pledgeable non-proprietary assets (i.e.
(1 − h)∑j∈Bi si←jACoutj ) received from other banks via reverse repos. Notice that ACrmi =
(1 − δiθi)ACi and that AC
out
i = δiθiA
C
i . Substituting the latter expression in equation (4) we
obtain a system of equations in the variables AC :
ACi = A
0
i + (1− h)
∑
j∈Bi
si←jδjθjA
C
j . (5)
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So far we have not said anything about timing in our model. However, the possibility of
collateral use and re-use changes over time as the inflows and outflows of collateral in a bank’s
box change over time as a consequence of the different uses and re-uses of collateral made by
other banks in the network. In addition, the very possibility of re-using collateral is clearly
constrained by the maturity of a repo contract Trepo. In what follows, we shall assume that the
maturity of repo contracts is longer than the time scale of the rehypothecation process.6
Moreover we shall focus on equilibrium collateral. This equilibrium corresponds to the
amount of collateral flow generated by the system over an infinite amount of steps of collateral
uses and re-uses. Finally, we shall focus henceforth only on the equilibrium value of the outflow-
ing collateral AC
out
(equilibrium collateral henceforth). Indeed, first, via Equation 4 remaining
collateral AC
rm
is also determined in equilibrium once the amount of outflowing collateral AC
out
and the initial proprietary collateral A0 are known. Second, outflowing collateral is a very inter-
esting variable in our model, as it captures each bank’s contribution to overall collateral flows,
and thus to overall funding liquidity in the market.
To find the equilibrium of outflowing collateral, let us start by writing equation (2) in matrix
form
AC
out
= A0
out
+ (1− h)MACout (6)
where the the elements M is the adjacency matrix of the rehypothecation network G, with
elements mi←j defined as:


mi←j = δiθisi←j =
δiθiai←j
koutj
, if koutj > 0,
mi←j = 0, if k
out
j = 0.
Given the network of collateral flows G, the haircut rate h, and the vector of non-hoarding rates
θ = {θi}ni=1, we can obtain the equilibrium value of AC
out
by solving equation (6) as follows:
AC
out
= (I − (1− h)M)−1A0out = B1A0out, (7)
with I is the identity matrix of size N , B1 = (I − (1− h)M)−1. The above equation indicates
that equilibrium collateral will in general be a function of the of the entire topology of the
rehypothecation network G and of the vector of non-hoarding rates θ = {θi}ni=1. In the next
sections we first study the role of the network topology in affecting collateral flows and in
determining different levels of equilibrium collateral.
6Notice that in many cases, the rehypothecation process ends already after a small number of steps, typically
smaller than the number of banks in the system. In addition, the effective duration of the rehypothecation process
exponentially decreases with the levels of the non-hoarding rates and of the haircut rates (see also next section).
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3 Rehypothecation networks and endogenous collateral
We shall now describe how the structure of the rehypothecation network affects collateral flows
and equilibrium collateral determined according to the model developed in the previous section.
To perform our investigation it is useful to define some aggregate indicators mesuring the per-
formance of a network in affecting collateral flows. The first one is the aggregate amount of
outgoing collateral, Sout, or “total collateral” henceforth, which is defined as:
Sout =
i=N∑
i=1
AC
out
i , (8)
In addition, we also introduce the multiplier of the aggregate amount of proprietary collateral7,
m, or “collateral multiplier”, henceforth. It is defined as:
m =
∑i=N
i=1 A
Cout
i∑i=N
i=1 A
0out
i
=
Sout
S0out
, (9)
where S0
out
=
∑i=N
i=1 A
0out
i is the total outflowing proprietary collateral. Throughout the paper,
we shall focus on Sout and m when analyzing collateral creation allowed by a given network
G. Notice that Sout captures the aggregate flow of collateral provided by banks in the financial
system. A higher (lower) amount of this flow indicates a more liquid market, i.e. one where
agents can easily find collateral to secure their financial transactions. Furthermore, notice that
the denominator on the right hand side of equation (9) is the aggregate amount of initial ou-
flowing collateral. Accordingly, m captures the velocity of collateral when rehypothecation is
allowed (see also Singh, 2011). Again, a higher value of m indicates a more liquid market,
and in particular one where the same set of collateral can secure a larger set of secured lend-
ing contracts. In that respect, we shall also say that a rehypothecation network G generates
“endogenous collateral” whenever the collateral multiplier associated with it is larger (m > 1)
Clearly, both performance indicator are affected by the hoarding behavior of banks in the net-
work. To simplify the analysis in this section we shall assume the non-hoarding and hoarding
rates are fixed, so that θi = θ¯ and (1 − θi) = (1 − θ¯), ∀i. In Section 4, we shall remove this
restriction, and we shall discuss how banks set these coefficients endogenously, according to a
VaR criterion in presence of liquidity shocks.
We shall begin our analysis by providing stylized examples and by stating proposition that
show how the aggregate amount of collateral going out of the boxes of all banks, Sout, and
the multiplier of collateral, m, are influenced by some key characteristics of rehypothecation
7See Financial Stability Board (2017a) for discussions of other collateral re-use measures.
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networks, like the length of rehypothecation chains, the presence of cyclic chains, or the direction
of collateral flows. In additions, these results shed light on the core mechanisms driving the
generation of endogenous collateral and of collateral hoarding cascades in more complex network
architectures.
3.1 Length of chains and network cycles
Let us start with simple examples of chains composed by three banks as shown in Figure 1:
panel (a) a star chain, panel (b) an open chain or “a-cyclic” chain, and panel (c) a closed chain
or a “cycle”.
Star chain Open chain Closedchain
1
2 3
1
2 3
1
2 3
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: Examples of rehypothecation chains among three banks.
Star chains
In the first case (i.e. the star chain in Figure 1 (a)), B2 receives collateral from B1 and
B3, and then it does not re-use it. We will show that without rehypothecation, there is no
endogenous collateral created in the system. Before discussing the example, we denote by AC
out
i,T
the cumulated amount of collateral ougoing from the box of the bank i after T times. In addition,
Souta,T indicates total collateral after T times and ma,T the corresponding multiplier.
8 At t = 1,
the initial total amounts of collateral outgoing from the boxes of B1, B2, B3 are


AC
out
1,t=1 = A
0out
1 = θ1A
0
1 (going to bank 2)
AC
out
2,t=1 = A
0out
2 = 0
AC
out
3,t=1 = A
0out
3 = θ3A
0
3 (going to bank 2)
(10)
8Notice that AC
out
i mentioned in equation (7) is equilibrium collateral, and it corresponds to the amount of
outflowing collateral when T →∞.
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At t = T ≥ 2, ACouti remains constant ∀i since there is no re-use of collateral. We can write


AC
out
1,t=T
AC
out
3,t=T
AC
out
3,t=T

 =


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

+ (1− h)Ma


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

 , (11)
where
Ma =


0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0

 .
It follows that total collateral in the example of Figure 1 (a) is always equal to the sum of the
initial prorietary collateral outflowing from banks’ boxes and thus, that there is no creation of
endogenous collateral. That is, we get:
Souta = S
out
a,T =
i=3∑
i=1
AC
out
i,T = A
0out
1 +A
0out
3 , (12)
and
ma = ma,T =
∑i=3
i=1A
Cout
i,T∑i=3
i=1A
0out
i
= 1. (13)
A-cyclic chains
We now consider the second example represented by the open chain or a-cyclic chain in
Figure 1 (b). In this case B2 can re-use the collateral that it receives from B1. In presence
of rehypothecation the network generates endogenous collateral, Sout > S0
out
. However, the
possibilities of endogenous collateral creation are constrained by the length of the open chain
(and equal to 2 in the example shown in the figure). At t = 1, the initial amounts of collateral
outgoing from the boxes of B1, B2, B3 are


AC
out
1,t=1 = A
0out
1 = θ1A
0
1 (going to bank 2)
AC
out
2,t=1 = A
0out
2 = θ2A
0
2 (going to bank 3)
AC
out
3,t=1 = A
0out
3 = 0
(14)
At t = 2, bank 2 will re-use a fraction θ2 of an additional (re-pledgeable) collateral that it has
received from the bank 1 at time t = 1. Therefore, the amounts of collateral outgoing from the
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boxes of B1, B2, B3 are 

AC
out
1,t=2 = A
0out
1
AC
out
2,t=2 = A
0out
2 + (1− h)θ2A0
out
1
AC
out
3,t=2 = A
0out
3
(15)
which in matrix form reads


AC
out
1,t=2
AC
out
3,t=2
AC
out
3,t=2

 =


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

+ (1− h)Mb


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

 , (16)
where now
Mb =


0 0 0
θ2 0 0
0 0 0

 .
Since all elements of M tb are equal to zero for all t ≥ 2, we get that the equilibrium values of
total outflowing collateral and of the corresponding multiplier are:


AC
out
1,t=T
AC
out
2,t=T
AC
out
3,t=T

 =


AC
out
1,t=2
AC
out
3,t=2
AC
out
3,t=2

 (∀T ≥ 2).
In addition,
Soutb = S
out
b,T =
i=3∑
i=1
AC
out
i,t=T = A
0out
1 +A
0out
2 + θ2(1− h)A0
out
1 , (17)
and
mb = mb,T =
∑i=3
i=1A
Cout
i,t=T∑i=3
i=1A
0out
i
= 1 + θ2(1− h) A
0out
1
A0
out
1 +A
0out
2
. (18)
Notice that the above collateral multiplier is larger than 1 as long as h < 1 and θ2 > 0.
Cyclic chains
We now consider the third case when rehypothecation processes among banks create a closed
chain or a “cycle”, like the one in Figure 1 (c). Notice that in the above example every bank has
a positive out-degree, i.e. kouti > 0,∀i = 1, 2, 3 and accordingly, δi = 1,∀i = 1, 2, 3 (cf. Section
2.2). We will now show that the creation of endogenous collateral is no longer constrained by
the length of the chain, and thus that in the end total collateral and the multipliers are larger
than in previous example.
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At t = 1, the initial total amounts of outgoing collateral are:


AC
out
1,t=1 = A
0out
1 = θ1A
0
1 (going to bank 2)
AC
out
2,t=1 = A
0out
2 = θ2A
0
2 (going to bank 3)
AC
out
3,t=1 = A
0out
3 = θ3A
0
3 (going to bank 1)
(19)
Furthermore, at t = 2, each bank i will re-use a fraction θi of the additional re-pledgeable
collateral that it has received from other banks at the previous time. We thus get:


AC
out
1,t=2 = A
0out
1 + θ1(1− h)A0
out
3
AC
out
2,t=2 = A
0out
2 + θ2(1− h)A0
out
1
AC
out
3,t=2 = A
0out
3 + θ3(1− h)A0
out
2
(20)
and in matrix form 

AC
out
1,2
AC
out
3,2
AC
out
3,2

 =


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

+ (1− h)Mc


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

 , (21)
where
Mc =


0 0 θ1
θ2 0 0
0 θ3 0

 .
Notice that θ1(1−h)A0out3 , θ2(1−h)A0
out
1 , θ3(1−h)A0
out
2 are respectively the additional amounts
of collateral that banks 1, 2, and 3 receive from all other banks. Moreover, at t = 3, each bank i
will again re-use a fraction θi of the additional re-pledgeable collateral that it has received from
other banks at time t = 2. Therefore,


AC
out
1,t=3 = A
0out
1 + θ1A
0out
3 (1− h) + θ1(1 − h)θ3(1− h)A0
out
2
AC
out
2,t=3 = A
0out
2 + θ2A
0out
1 (1− h) + θ2(1 − h)θ1(1− h)A0
out
3
AC
out
3,t=3 = A
0out
3 + θ3A
0out
2 (1− h) + θ3(1 − h)θ2(1− h)A0
out
1
(22)
which in matrix form reads


AC
out
1,3
AC
out
3,3
AC
out
3,3

 =


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

+ [(1 − h)Mc]1


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

+ [(1− h)Mc]2


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

 . (23)
In general, at t = T + 1, i.e. after T times of collateral re-uses, the cumulated amounts of
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outgoing collateral are:


AC
out
1,T+1
AC
out
2,T+1
AC
out
3,T+1

 = {I + [(1 − h)Mc]1 + [(1− h)Mc]2 + ...+ [(1 − h)Mc]T }


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

 . (24)
Expressed differently,


AC
out
1,T+1
AC
out
2,T+1
AC
out
3,T+1

 =


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

+ (1− h)Mc


AC
out
1,T
AC
out
2,T
AC
out
3,T

 . (25)
Clearly, the additional collateral in the system is now equal to
[((1− h)Mc)1 + ((1− h)Mc)2 + .....((1 − h)Mc)T ]


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3

 .
Finally, when T →∞, we obtain the equilibrium values for Soutc and formc. Their expressions
are the following:
Soutc = lim
t→∞
Soutc,t = lim
t→∞
i=3∑
i=1
AC
out
i,t , (26)
and
mc = lim
t→∞
mc,t = lim
t→∞
∑i=3
i=1A
Cout
i,t∑i=3
i=1A
0out
i
. (27)
To conclude, it is interesting to notice that, as long as {A0i }i=3i=1 and {θi}i=3i=1 are homogenous
across banks, we have the following ranking Soutc > S
out
b > S
out
a and mc > mb > ma.
3.2 Direction of collateral flows, collateral sinks and cycles’ length
The above examples have clarified what are the fundamental properties that a rehypothecation
network must have in order to create endogenous collateral, and thus additional liquidity in the
system. In particular, the second example (the a-cyclic chain) makes clear that the possibilities
of additional collateral creation are determined by the length of the repledging chains among
banks. However, the presence of cycles in networks, like the third example above, allows one to
go beyond that, and to maximize the amount of collateral creation. Furthermore, in presence
of cyclic networks the direction of collateral flows also matters. In particular, networks wherein
collateral flows all end up in a cycle will ceteris paribus create more endogenous collateral than
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networks where some collateral leaks out from cycles and sinks in some nodes of the system.
To better clarify the foregoing statement, we consider in Figure 2, three example networks of
five nodes with the same number of links. In addition, in these networks, all out-degrees are
positive, and consequently collateral from each node will flow into a cycle after going through
some directed edges9, and there is no leakage from the cycle. The only difference among the
three networks is in the length of cycles. Nevertheless, we will show that as long as non-hoarding
rates are constant and homogeneous, the three networks generate the same equilibrium total
collateral and the have the same equilibrium multiplier. This is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. Let θi = θ (∀i). For the networks in panels α = a, b, c of Figure (2) Soutα,t =∑i=5
i=1A
Cout
i,t , ∀t ≥ 1.
Proof. See appendix.
3
2 5
1
4 3
2 5
1
4 3
2 5
1
4
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: Different rehypothecation process among five banks: same number of links, different lengths of
cycles but same total amounts of equilibrium collateral.
Let us next consider three other examples of rehypothecation process among five banks, the
ones in Figure (3). The difference with examples of Figure 2 is that now in panels (a) and (b)
one node (i.e. node 5) has zero out-degree. In addition, the network structure in these two
panels imply that some collateral leaks out of a cycle and gets stuck at the node with zero
out-degree, which then plays the role of “collateral sink”. The consequence is that the three
networks will generate different amounts of total equilibrium collateral. This is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let θi = θ (∀i). For the networks in panels α = a, b, c of Figure 3, Souta,t <
Soutb,t < S
out
c,t , ∀t ≥ 2.
9It is also possible to show that, as long as all agents have positive out-degree, collateral flows will end up in
a cycle after a finite number of steps. For the sake of brevity we do not report this proposition and the related
proof. However, it is available from the authors upon request.
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Proof. See appendix.
3
2 5
1
4 3
2 5
1
4 3
2 5
1
4
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Different rehypothecation process among five banks: same number of links but different total
amounts of equilibrium collateral.
The above two propositions deliver interesting implications about the role of networks’ topol-
ogy in determining total collateral flows. First, Proposition 2 shows that the total amount of
collateral is maximized when the longest possible cycle in the network has been created (a cycle
of length 5 in example (c) of Figure 3). At the same time, proposition 1 shows that cycles’
length is irrelevant when collateral sinks are not present in the network and all banks have
positive out-degree, i.e. they have at least one repo with some other bank in the system. It
also follows that in that case, it might be advantageous frow the viewpoint of total creation
of collateral in the network to concentrate collateral flows among few nodes that have a cyclic
chain among them. These results provide key insights to understand the behaviour of collateral
flows in different network architectures that we shall discuss in the next section. They are also
central to understand some of the results about collateral hoarding cascades that we will expose
in Section 5.
The next two propositions generalize the above results to any network architecture. The
first of them shows that adding an arbitrary number of links to a cycle of length equal to the
size of the network does not change neither total collateral nor the value of the multiplier. The
second one identifies the upper bounds for the equilibrium values of total collateral and of the
collateral multiplier and shows that these upper limits are attained as long as every bank has
at least one outgoing link in the network.
Proposition 3. Consider a rehypothecation network G of size N . Let θi = θ and A0i = A0 (∀i).
Adding arbitrary links to an initial cycle of sizeN does not change the values of Sout andm. More
in general, as long as there is the presence of the largest cycle, Sout and m remain unchanged
as the density inside that cycle increases.
Proof. See the appendix.
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Proposition 4. Consider a rehypothecation network G of size N . Let θi = θ and A0i = A0 (∀i).
If kouti > 0 (∀i) then equilibrium values of Sout and m are equal to the following upper limits:
Sout =
θ
1− (1− h)θNA
0,
and
m =
1
1− (1− h)θ .
Proof. See the appendix.
3.3 Network architecture and collateral creation
We now address the issue of how does the network structure more in general affects collateral
creation. We shall focus on three very different classes of network structures. These classes
represent general archetypes of networks in the literature, and they also capture some idealized
modes of organization of financial contracts in the market. The first class consists of the closed
k-regular graphs of size N , Greg , wherein each node has k in-coming neighbors as well as k out-
going neighbors. This archetype corresponds to a market where repo contracts are homogenously
spread across banks, so that each bank has exactly the same number of repos and of reverse repos.
We consider different types of closed regular graphs of varying levels of density 1
N−1 < p < 1.
Special cases of this structure are the cycle of size N (where p = 1
N−1) and the complete network
(p = 1), wherein each bank has a repo with every other bank in the network (and vice-versa)
and where the number of incoming and outgoing links is the same for all banks and equal to
N − 1. The second class consists of the random graphs Grg, in which there is a mild degree
of heterogeneity in the distribution of financial contracts across banks. Here, the probability
of a directed link (and thus of the existence of repo) between every two nodes is equal to the
density p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) of the network. Notice that as p→ 1 the random graph converges to the
complete graph. Finally, the third class we examine here consists of core-periphery networks,
Gcp, where (i) the number of nodes in the core, Ncore, is fixed; (ii) each node in the periphery
has only out-going links, and all point to nodes in the core; (iii) nodes in the core are also
randomly connected among themselves with the probability pcore (0 ≤ pcore ≤ 1), and there are
no directed links from the core to the periphery nodes. Notice that the latter type of structure
exacerbates heterogeneity in the distribution of financial contracts and it centralizes collateral
flows among nodes in the core. This structure is also interesting from an empirical viewpoint as
high concentration of collateral flows is often observed in actual markets (see e.g. Singh, 2011).
We begin our analysis of the three structures by characterizing the behaviour of endogenous
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collateral formation in the closed k-regular graphs.
Proposition 5. Let θi = θ and A
0
i = A
0 (∀i). A closed-k regular rehypothecation network Greg
of size N , and a density p = k
N−1 , always returns the same equilibrium values of total collateral
Soutreg and of collateral multiplier mreg for any density
1
N−1 < p < 1. The equilibrium values are
given by the limits stated in Proposition 4.
The above statement follows directly from Proposition 3 above. A closed k-regular of density
1
N−1 already embeds the longest possible cycle that is possible to create in a network of size
N . Accordingly adding further links does not bring any change in equilibrium values of total
collateral and of the multipliers, which are always equal to the upper bounds stated in Propo-
sition 4. In contrast to the close k-regular graph, the random network and of core-periphery
networks display some variation in total collateral and in the multiplier with for increasing levels
of density. The following proposition characterizes the behavior of the latter two variables in
these two network structures.10
Proposition 6. Let θi = θ and A
0
i = A
0 (∀i), then:
1. A random graph Grg of size N creates more equilibrium collateral and a higher multiplier
with higher level of density p.
2. A core-periphery graph of Gcp of size N creates more equilibrium collateral and a higher
multiplier with higher level of density pcore of the core.
3. For any graph density 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, ∃ pth = pth(N,Ncore, p) such that a core-periphery graph
of Gcp creates more equilibrium collateral and a higher multiplier than random graphs Grg
for any pcore > pth.
4. As the overall density p in the random graph (or the density pcore of the core in the core-
periphery graph) goes to 1, the equilibrium values of total collateral and the multiplier
converge to the limits stated in Proposition 4.
Proof. See the appendix.
10In the next proposition we determine the equilibrium for bank’s collaterals in the case of an average system,
that is instead of considering each single sample of collateral networks we consider the expected value of the
amount of collateral for each banks, and solve only for a single average system. For all cases, numerical evidence
strongly supports the analytical results.
18
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
density
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
So
u
t
104 under closed k-regular graphs
(a)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
density
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
So
u
t
104 under random graphs
(b)
0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05
overall density
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
x 10
4
density in the core
S
o
u
t
under core−periphery graphs
(c)
Figure 4: Total collateral (Sout) as a function of density under different network structures. Notice the
different scale for the overal density in panel (c).
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Figure 5: Collateral multiplier (m) as a function of density under different network structures. Notice
the different scale for the overal density in panel (c).
The plots in Figures 4 and 5 help to visualize the results contained in the last two propo-
sitions. The plots show equilibrium values of total collateral and of the multiplier resulting
from numerical simulations11 using each of the three network topologies examined above (closed
k-regular, random graph, and core-periphery) and with different levels density (of pcore for the
core-periphery). First, the plots show that both total collateral and the multiplier do not change
with the level of density in the closed k-regular graph (plot (a) in both figures). In contrast,
both variables increase with the level of density in the random graph and in the core-periphery
network (respectively, panels (b) and (c) of the two figures), before eventually converging to
the same value of the close k-regular graph (and determined by the expressions in Proposition
4). The main intuition for the latter result is that increasing the level of density (in the overall
network or in the core) increases both the number and the length of cycles in the network12.
These two factors have a positive impact on endogenous collateral creation in the network, as
we explained in Section 3.2. However, when the longest possible cycle in the network (for the
random graph) or in the core (for the core-periphery graph) adding further links does not longer
11The numerical simulation is implemented with N = 50, h = 0.1, 1− θ = 0.1, and A0 = 100 for all banks.
12In addition, for the random graph, the number of nodes with positive out-degree also increases with density.
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increase endogenous collateral. Furthermore, both the third statement of Proposition 6 and the
plots in the figures indicate the core-perihery network generates a much higher total collateral
than the random graph already with small increases in density. For instance the inspection
of Figure 6 reveals that already with N = 50 banks in the network a tiny increase in overall
density (from 0.02 to 0.03) has the effect of more than doubling the value of the multiplier (from
2 to almost 5). In contrast, a much larger change in density is required to produce a similar
effect in the random graph. This result generalizes the insights discussed in the previous section
(cf. Proposition 1). Once all banks have positive out-degree and they are thus all contributing
with outflowing collateral, concentrating all collateral flows in a small cycle (like the one in the
core) already generates the largest possible total collateral. This result has also implications for
markets organization, as it indicates that concentrating collateral flows among few nodes has
great advantages for the velocity of collateral and thus for the overall liquidity of the market.
At the same time, in the next section we shall show that - when liquidity hoarding externalities
are present - networks with highly concentrated collateral flows are also more exposed to larger
collateral hoarding cascades following small local shocks.
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Figure 6: Collateral multiplier (m) as a function of network the density in the random graph and in the
core-periphery network. Notice the double scale for the overall network density and the density of links
within the core of the core-periphery network.
4 Value at Risk and Collateral Hoarding
So far we have worked with the assumption that non-hoarding rates {θi}Ni=1 were constant across
time and homogeneous across banks. This has simplified the analysis and it has allowed us to
highlight the role of the characteristics of network topology in determining collateral flows in the
financial system. At the same time, this hypothesis is also quite restrictive as banks’ hoarding
and non-hoarding might be responsive to the liquidity risk situation of banks and, accordingly,
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also by the level of available collateral (see e.g. Acharya and Merrouche, 2010; Berrospide, 2012;
de Haan and van den End, 2013). In addition, recent accounts of collateral dynamics (Singh,
2012) have documented the sizeable reduction in velocity of collateral in the aftermath of the
last financial crisis as a result of increased collateral hoarding by banks. To account for these
important phenomena in this section we extend the basic model presented in Section 2 to
introduce time-varying non-hoarding rates determined by liquidity risk considerations.
Again, to keep the model as simple as possible we abstract from many important aspects
concerning the liquidity position of the banks. We assume that all funding is secured. For every
bank j let NLj be its net liquidity position. Recall that the amount of pledgeable collateral
of bank j that can be used to get external funds with a haircut h is ACj . At the same time,
if Lj 6= ∅, a fraction θj of this amount of collateral is already pledged (i.e. an amount of
AC
out
= θjA
C
j ). The net liquidity position of the bank j is thus given by:
NLj = (1− h)(1 − θj)ACj (θ1, θ2, ..., θN , A0,G) − ǫj, (28)
where ǫj are payments due within the periods, i.e. liquidity shocks, which are assumed to be
a i.i.d. normally distributed random variable with mean µj and standard deviation σj. The
notation ACj (θ1, θ2, ..., θN , A
0,G) emphasizes the fact that the total collateral position of a bank
depends also on the fractions of non-hoarded collateral of all banks in the network G. Notice
that the above equation implies that the more borrowers of j hoard collateral, the lower is the
value of collateral ACj , and thus the higher the need to hoard collateral for j.
Let us start by observing that if the liquidity shock is large enough, bank j defaults (i.e.
NLj < 0). This occurs when
ǫj > (1− h)(1− θj)ACj .
Given the assumption on the random variable ǫj, the default of j is an event occurring with
probability
prob.(NLj < 0) = prob.(ǫj > (1− h)(1 − θj)ACj ).
Furthermore, following Adrian and Shin (2010) and Adrian and Shin (2014), we assume that
each bank j employs a Value-at-Risk (VaR) strategy to determine the fraction 1−θj of collateral
to hoard, so that the above probability of default is not higher than a target (1 − cj) (where
0 < cj < 1). If we assume that returns on external assets held by j are higher than the repo
rate, then each bank j will decide the optimal fraction 1− θj such that
prob.(ǫj > (1− h)(1 − θj)ACj ) = 1− cj . (29)
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Given that ǫj are a i.i.d. normally distributed random variable we have
prob.(NLj < 0) = prob.(ǫj > (1− h)(1 − θj)ACj ) =
1
2
[1− erf((1 − h)(1 − θj)A
C
j − µj
σj
√
2
)], (30)
where erf is Gauss error function defined as
erf(x) =
1
π
∫ x
−x
e−t
2
dt. (31)
Under the VaR constraint bank j sets the share of hoarded collateral at the level θ∗j such
that
1
2
[1− erf((1− h)(1 − θj)A
C
j − µj
σj
√
2
)] = 1− cj (32)
⇔
erf(
(1− h)(1 − θj)ACj − µj
σj
√
2
) = 2cj − 1 (33)
⇔
θj = 1− σj
√
2argerf(2cj − 1) + µj
(1− h)ACj
, (34)
where argerf is the inverse error function defined in (−1, 1)→ R such that
erf(argerf(x)) = x. (35)
Equation (34) indicates that θj is a decreasing function of the VaR target cj , of the uncer-
tainty about the liquidity shock (captured by σj), of the mean of the liquidity shock µj , and of
the haircut rate h. Moreover, it is an increasing function of value of the collateral AC as well as
of the shares of non-hoarded collateral of other banks in the network. Denote
c0j = σj
√
2argerf(2cj − 1) + µj , (36)
we then obtain the following final expression for the optimal θj under the assumption of normally-
distributed liquidity shocks.
θj = 1−
c0j
(1− h)ACj (θ1, θ2, ..., θN , A0,G)
. (37)
Notice that the endogenous level of non-hoarding, θj, depends now not only on the uncer-
tainty about ǫj but also on the haircut rate h, as well as on the value of the collateral A
C
j . The
interdependence between θj and A
C
j implies that each bank will adjust its hoarding preference
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(i.e. hold more or less collateral) in anticipation of expected “losses” or “gains” in its total
amount of collateral. It also follows that a change in hoarding rates at bank j will induce a
change in hoarding rates at banks to which j is connected to.
We now investigate the existence of equilibria in non-hoarding rates. Let us start by noticing
that Equation (37) indicates that, for every bank j, if Lj 6= ∅, its hoarding can in general be
expressed as:
(1− θj) =
c0j
(1− h)ACj (θ1, θ2, ..., θN , A0,G)
, (38)
where the variable c0j defined by equation (36) captures the effects of uncertainty in ǫj on (1−θj).
Since θj ∈ [0, 1], it follows that ACj (θ1, θ2, ..., θN , A0,G) must be in [
c0j
1−h ,∞]. From equation (38),
it follows that
(1− h)θj =
(1− h)ACj − c0j
ACj
. (39)
Equivalently,
(1− h) θj
koutj
=
(1 − h)ACj − c0j
ACj k
out
j
. (40)
Recall that under the assumption that banks homogenously spread collateral across their
lenders, we have
wi←j = θjsi←j =
θj
koutj
, ∀i ∈ Lj 6= ∅.
Therefore,
(1− h)wi←j =
(1− h)ACj − c0j
ACj k
out
j
, ∀i ∈ Lj 6= ∅.
Next, denote by W˜V aR = {w˜i←j} the matrix with size (NxN) where


w˜i←j =
(1−h)ACj −c
0
j
ACj k
out
j
, ∀i ∈ Lj 6= ∅
w˜i←j = 0, elsewhere
(41)
The level of collateral ACi is then obtained by solving the following equation
ACi = A
0
i +
∑
j∈Bi
w˜i←jA
C
j ∀i = 1, 2, ...N. (42)
Finally, the non-hoarded rates θi can be obtained by substituting A
C
i into equation (39).
In general, the solution to the system composed by the system of equations in (42) might not
be unique. However, the following proposition establishes sufficient conditions for the uniqueness
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of the solution.
Proposition 7. Let b˜ be a column vector size Nx1, given by
b˜ = A0 − SC0. (43)
Define the matrix A˜ = {a˜i←j} with size NxN as
A˜ = I − (1− h)S. (44)
If 0 < h < 1 and A˜−1b˜ ≥ C01−h where C0 = [c01, c02, ..., c0N−1, c0N ]T is the column vector capturing
the effects of the net liquidity shock on hoarding preferences, then the system (42) has the unique
solution13:
AC = A˜−1b˜. (45)
Proof. See the appendix.
Finally, by substituting AC in (45) into equation (39), we obtain the solution to the equilib-
rium rates of non-hoarded collateral as follows
θj = 1−
c0j
(1− h)A˜−1b˜ . (46)
In the next section, we use the results obtained from the above proposition about the determi-
nation of equilibrium banks’ collateral ACj and non-hoarding rates θj to study the emergence
of collateral hoarding cascades under different network structures when some banks are hit by
uncertainty shocks, captured by an increase in the variable c0j .
5 Collateral hoarding cascades
We now use the VaR collateral hoarding model developed in the previous section to study how
different structures of rehypothecation networks react when a fraction of banks in the network
is hit by adverse shocks. In particular we focus on uncertainty shocks14 that cause the variable
c0i in Equation (37) to increase to c
1
i = c
0
i (1 + c˜
0) for some banks i, where c˜0 ≥ 0. The rise
in uncertainty will lead those banks to increase their hoarding of collateral. In turn, this will
13Throughout this paper, for any two vectors X and Y of size n, then X ≥ Y if Xi ≥ Yi,∀i = 1, ...n.
14We also performed analysis of the impact of aggregate shocks to the value of collateral. However, results and
the dynamics were similar to the one reported in the paper.
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trigger a cascade of hoarding effects at banks that are either directly or indirectly connected to
the banks initially it by the uncertainty shock. Indeed, higher hoarding at bank i will also cause
a loss in the collateral flowing into bank’s i neighbors. As a consequence, the latter banks will
also increase their hoarding rates, causing further loss in collateral inflows at other banks in the
system and thus further adjustments in hoarding rates at other banks in the system. The final
result of the foregoing cascade will be a new equilibrium characterized, in general, by a lower
level of total collateral in the system. On the grounds of the results stated in Proposition 7 we
can determine the new equilibrium vector of collateral in the aftermath of the local uncertainty
shock. More formally, let C1 = [c11, c12, ..., c1N−1, c1N ]T the new vector of uncertainty factors in the
aftermath of the local uncertainty shock. By substituting C1 into equations (45) and (43), we
obtain the new equilibrium solution, AC
1
, to AC at the end of the hoarding cascade as
AC
1
= A˜−1[A0 − SC1]. (47)
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Figure 7: Collateral multiplier and collateral losses following local uncertainty shocks, in different network
structures and for different overall density levels. In each panel, the left y-axis shows the ratio between
total outflowing collateral and total proprietary collateral Sout/S0 (solid line). The right y-axis shows
total collateral Sout after shock (relative to the pre-shock level, dashed line). Different network structures
are represented by different colors and markers: closed k-regular graph (black, no marker), random graphs
(green, squares), core-periphery graphs (magenta, diamonds).
Let us now investigate how after-shock equilibrium collateral of behaves in different networks.
The plots in Figure 7 show the pre-shock levels of the ratio between equilibrium total outflowing
collateral Sout and total proprietary collateral S0 (left scale). Moreover, they show equilibrium
total ouflowing collateral after the shock relative to its pre-shock value (right-scale). The two
variables are plotted as functions of network density and for the three different structures exam-
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ined in Section 3.3, namely the closed k-regular network Greg, the random network Grg, and the
core-periphery network Gcp. The plots refers to numerical investigations of equilibrium collateral
before and after a fraction f = 20% of banks in the network experiences a 50% increase in the
uncertainty factor (so that c˜0 = 0.5) and are performed under two different shocks scenarios.
In the first of them (“random attack”, left-side plots) the banks hit by the uncertainty shock
are randomly selected. In the second scenario (“targeted attack”, right-side plots) the shocked
banks are selected according to their centrality15 in the network (in descending order).16 Notice
that the second scenario is relevant only for the random network and for the core-periphery, as
all nodes have the same centrality in the closed k-regular network.
The analysis of Figure 7 reveals first that - before the shock - the behaviour of total collateral
under the three network structures is the same as the one discussed in Section 3.3 for the case of
constant hoarding rates17. Second, the effects of the local uncertainty shock vary with density
only in the random network and in the core-periphery network. In contrast, the loss in total
collateral does not change with density in the closed k-regular graph. Third, the overall impact
of the shock is very different across the scenarios considered. In particular, the maximal impact
is quite small (only a 10% loss) for all the three structures in the random attack scenario. In
addition, all the structure generate the same total loss as overall density converges to 1. In
contrast, in the targeted attack scenario, the total loss generated in presence of a core-periphery
network is much larger than in the other network structures (up to 50% of the initial total
collateral value) and increases with density.
Thus, the core-periphery network generates very large losses in collateral when central nodes
are hit by local uncertainty shocks. Recall that those nodes are precisely the one concentrating
collateral flows, and thus generating the large increases in endogenous collateral stressed in
Section 3.3. It follows that the core-periphery network displays a trade-off between liquidity
and systemic (liquidity) risk. On the one hand, concentrating collateral flows generates large
gains in market liquidity already with a low density of the network. On the other hand, high
concentration produces large liquidity losses when small local shock come across. Indeed, by
concentrating collateral flows, more central nodes have also a larger impact on collateral at
the peripheral nodes that have connections with them, and they thus trigger a must stronger
adjustment in hoarding rates thereafter. Notice that these concentration effects underlying the
large liquidity losses in the core-periphery network are much smaller in the random graph (where
15We use “PageRank” centrality (see Newman, 2010; Battiston et al., 2012, for more details). However, the
main conclusions still hold when the degree centrality is employed.
16The other parameters of the simulation where set so that the number of banks is N = 50, and h = 0.1,
A0i = 100, 1− θi = 0.1 and c
0
i = 1 for all banks.
17Indeed, all the results of Propositions 5 and 6 hold also in the model where hoarding rates are determined
according to a VaR criterion. For the sake of brevity, we do not report here these propositions and the related
proofs. However, they are available from the authors upon request.
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link heterogeneity is small). In addition, they are completely absent in the closed k-regular graph,
where all nodes have the same centrality.
To conclude, it is useful to stress that the presence of liquidity hoarding externalities is
central for the above results about the trade-off observed in the core-periphery networks. In
other terms, targeted local shocks would have a small impact in core-periphery networks if
hoarding rates were not responsive to changes in the liquidity positions of banks. To understand
why, notice that with constant hoarding rates a loss in collateral value or an exogenous increase
in hoarding rates at one bank i will only have a nth-order effect at other banks directly or
indirectly connected to it. And this is because the initial shock is dampened by haircut rates
and hoarding rates at other banks along the chain. For instance, in the very simple case of
the cycle (i.e. closed chain) displayed in Figure 1 (c) a shock to outflowing collateral at node
1 (A0
out
1 ) will have an effect only of order θ3(1 − h)θ2(1 − h) on outflowing collateral at node 3
(see also Equation (22)). In contrast, in the case of VaR-determined hoarding rates, the effect
can be large because it is reinforced by the process of agents’ revising their hoarding rates at
each step along the rehypothecation chain.18
6 Concluding remarks
We have introduced and analyzed a simple model to study collateral flows over a network of
repo contracts among banks. We have assumed that, to obtain secured funding, banks may
pledge their proprietary collateral or re-pledge the collateral obtained by other banks via reverse
repos. The latter practice is known as “rehypothecation” and it has clear advantages for market
liquidity as it allows banks to secure more transactions with the same set of collateral. At the
same time, re-pledging other banks’ collateral may also raise liquidity risk concerns, as several
banks rely on the same collateral for their repo transactions. We have focused on investigating
which characteristics of rehypothecation networks are key in order to increase the velocity of
collateral flows, and thus increase the liquidity in the market. We have first assumed that
banks hoard a constant fraction of their collateral. Under this hypothesis we have shown that
characteristics of the network like the length of re-pledging chains, the presence of cyclic chains
or the direction of collateral flows are key determinant of the level of endogenous collateral in the
system, defined as a overall level of collateral larger than the initial proprietary endowments of
banks. In particular, we have shown that the level of endogenous collateral increases with chains’
length. However, cyclic chains allow, ceteris paribus, for a larger endogenous collateral than a-
cyclic chains of the same length. Finally, we have shown that endogenous collateral is large
18In particular, in the example of Figure 1 (c) with VaR-based hoarding rates the effect of a shock to A0
out
1 on
the outflowing collateral of node 3 be of the order (1− h)2
(
θ3θ2 + θ3
∂θ2
∂A0
out
1
+ θ2
∂θ3
∂A0
out
1
)
.
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already with small cyclic chains if the banks involved centralize collateral flows. The foregoing
features of network topology underlie the results about the determination of total collateral
in more general network architectures. In particular, we showed that total collateral increases
with density in the random network (displaying a mild heterogeneity in collateral flows across
banks) and in the core-periphery networks (displaying high concentration of collateral flows).
Nevertheless, core-periphery networks generate larger collateral than random networks already
with smaller increase in the density of the network. The foregoing results have implications
for the micro-structure of markets where collateral is important, as they highlight a new factor
besides network density - i.e. concentration in collateral flows - that allows for significant gains
in market liquidity. A market with highly concentrated collateral flows generates higher velocity
of collateral, as it is thus more liquid, even if banks are not tied by a dense network of financial
contracts.
Furthermore, we have extended the model to allow for endogenous levels of hoarding rates
that depend on the liquidity position of each bank in the network. More precisely, we assumed
that banks set their hoarding rates by adopting a Value-at-Risk criterion aimed at minimizing
the risk of liquidity defaults. We have shown that, in these framework, hoarding rates of each
single bank are in general dependent on other banks’ rates and collateral levels, a feature which
introduces important collateral hoarding externalities in the analysis. We have then used the
above framework to study the overall impact on collateral flows of local adverse shocks leading
to an increase in payments’ uncertainty at some banks in the market, in particular investigat-
ing how the response may vary with the topology of the rehypothecation network. We have
highlighted that core-periphery networks generate larger losses in overall collateral compared
to other network structures (closed k-regular network, random network) when the nodes ex-
periencing the shock are the most central nodes in the network, i.e. the ones concentrating
collateral flows. This result has interesting implications for the regulatory analysis of markets
with collateral, as it shows that the same network structures allowing for the largest increase
in collateral velocity - i.e. core-periphery networks - are also the ones more exposed to largest
collateral hoarding cascades in case of local shocks. A trade-off between liquidity and systemic
(liquidity) risk thus emerges in those networks. In addition, our results also suggest that - in
the presence of rehypothecation - regulatory liquidity and collateral requirements imposed to
banks need to account for the structure of the network of lending contracts across banks. In
particular, such requirements should both account for the systemic role (e.g. centrality) of the
banks in the collateral flow network, as well as account for the whole topology of the network
(e.g. for the presence of hierarchical structures such as the core-periphery architecture).
Our work could be extended at least in three ways. First, in these work we have abstracted
from many important aspects of real-world secured lending markets, such as heterogeneous col-
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lateral quality and endogenous haircut rates. Introducing these elements could probably enrich
our results. In particular, in the model the haircut rate affects the extent of rehypothecation.
Accordingly, endogenous haircut rates that reflect different levels of counterparty risk can be
an additional source of externalities in the model. Second, we have used the Value at Risk
criterion to determine hoarding rates in our model. However, hoarding rates may also result
from liquidity requirements imposed to banks. It would then be interesting to extend the model
to study how different requirements that have been proposed so far may impact on market liq-
uidity in presence of rehypothecation, and how these requirements should be designed in order
to minimize the liquidity-systemic risk trade-off that we highlighted above. Finally, we have
focused on bilateral repo contracts. However, it would be interesting to study how our results
might change in presence of try-party repo structures, and in the presence of central clearing
counterparties that interact with banks re-using their collateral.
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7 Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
Proof of proposition 1
Let us start by remarking that, in all cases shown in Figure (2), we have kouti > 0 (∀i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and thus
δi = 1 (∀i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) and 
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In the case of Figure 2 (a), the dynamics of {AC
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i,T }
5
i=1 will follow
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We obtain 
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In the case of Figure 2 (b), the length of the closed cycle is 4, and now the dynamics of {AC
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i,T }
5
i=1 is governed
by the following system 
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Mb =

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0 0 0 0 0
θ2 0 0 0 θ2
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
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In the third case, with the the closed cycle of length 5 (Figure 2 (c)), the dynamics of {AC
out
i,T }
5
i=1 is governed
by the following system 
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It can be easily shown that given {θi}i = θ (∀i) (i.e. under the condition of homogeneous hoarding), all panels
α = a, b, c in Figure (2) create the same amount of Soutα,t =
∑i=5
i=1A
Cout
i,t for all t ≥ 1. This is because in all cases
of α we have the same dynamics Soutα,t+1 = S
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α,1 + (1− h)θS
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α,t and they also all have the same initial aggregate
amount of outgoing collateral, i.e. Soutα,1 = θ
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i . In addition, in all panels of Figure (2) we have that
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.
Proof of proposition 2 In the case represented by Figure 3 (a), kout5 = 0→ δ5 = 0, therefore
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In the case represented by Figure 3 (b), we still have that

AC
out
1,t=1 = A
0out
1 = θ1A
0
1
AC
out
2,t=1 = A
0out
2 = θ2A
0
2
AC
out
3,t=1 = A
0out
3 = θ3A
0
3
AC
out
2,t=1 = A
0out
4 = θ4A
0
4
AC
out
3,t=1 = A
0out
5 = 0
(58)
The dynamics of {AC
out
i,T }
5
i=1 will follow

AC
out
1,T+1 = A
0out
1 + (1− h)θ1
AC
out
4,T
2
AC
out
2,T+1 = A
0out
2 + (1− h)θ2A
Cout
1,T
AC
out
3,T+1 = A
0out
3 + (1− h)θ3A
Cout
2,T
AC
out
4,T+1 = A
0out
4 + (1− h)θ4A
Cout
3,T
AC
out
5,T+1 = 0
(59)
We obtain 

AC
out
1,T+1
AC
out
2,T+1
AC
out
3,T+1
AC
out
4,T+1
AC
out
5,T+1

 = [I + [(1− h)Mb]
1 + [(1− h)Mb]
2 + ...+ [(1− h)Mb]
t]


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3
A0
out
4
0

 , (60)
33
with
Mb =


0 0 0 θ1
2
0
θ2 0 0 0 0
0 θ3 0 0 0
0 0 θ4 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

 .
Furthermore, in the case represented by Figure 3 (c), as shown in (48) and (54), we have
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
 = {I + [(1− h)Mc]
1 + [(1− h)Mc]
2 + ...+ [(1− h)Mc]
T }


A0
out
1
A0
out
2
A0
out
3
A0
out
4
A0
out
5

 ,
with
Mc =


0 0 0 0 θ1
θ2 0 0 0 0
0 θ3 0 0 0
0 0 θ4 0 0
0 0 0 θ5 0

 .
We can see that the main difference between Figure 3 (a) and Figure 3 (b) is mathematically expressed by the
difference between Ma and Mb: in the former case, a part of the initial outgoing collateral from the bank 4 is
flowing into the cycle, while in the later case all outgoing collateral from the bank 4 will stuck in the box of the
bank 5 and can not be re-used. In addition, comparing these cases to the one represented by Figure 3 (c), we
can see that in Figure 3 (c) the initial outgoing collateral from each bank can be re-used infinitely. Defining Souta,t ,
Soutb,t , and S
out
c,t are respectively the total amount of outgoing collateral of all banks in Figures 3 (a), (b), and (c)
after t times of using and re-using collateral, it can be proved by induction that Souta,t < S
out
b,t < S
out
c,t (∀t ≥ 2). This
implies that in contrast to the example illustrated in Figure (2), now longer cycles will generate more endogenous
collateral.
Proof of proposition 3.
To illustrate this proposition, without loss of generality we show an example of closed cycle of length N = 5
in Figure (8). We can add arbitrary links or cycles of length k = 3, 4 to the initial graph. In all examples shown
in Figure (8), we always have that kouti > 0 for every bank i. Proposition (3) is therefore just a special case of
Proposition 4, of which we will provide the proof later.
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3
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1
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1
4 3
2 5
1
4 3
2 5
1
4
(a) Add closedcyclesof length3 
(b) Add closedcyclesof length4 
Figure 8: Add different cycles (with length k = 3, ...N − 1) to an initial closed graph of size N . An
example is illustrated with N = 5 nodes. In the panel (a), we add cycles of length 3. In the panel (b),
we add cycles of length 4.
Proof of proposition 4.
First, since kouti > 0, hence δi = 1 (∀i). Accordingly, we have A
Cout
i = θA
C
i and A
0out
i = θA
0
i . Therefore,
m =
∑i=N
i=1 A
Cout
i∑i=N
i=1 A
0out
i
=
θ
∑i=N
i=1 A
C
i
θ
∑i=N
i=1 A
0
i
=
∑i=N
i=1 A
C
i∑i=N
i=1 A
0
i
.
In addition, since each column19 of the matrix of shares S = {si←j}NxN is summing to 1 and thus (1 −
h)
∑
i6=j wi←j = (1− h)θ (∀j), at the fixed point solution to A
C , we always have
i=N∑
i=1
A
C
i = (1− h)θ
i=N∑
i=1
A
C
i +
i=N∑
i=1
A
0
i .
Equivalently, ∑i=N
i=1 A
C
i∑i=N
i=1 A
0
i
=
1
1− (1− h)θ
.
Hence,
m =
∑i=N
i=1 A
Cout
i∑i=N
i=1 A
0out
i
=
1
1− (1− h)θ
. (61)
Proof of proposition 6.
Recall that under the basic model with homogeneous θ we have
A
C
i = A
0
i + (1− h)θ
∑
j∈Bi
si←jδjA
C
j ,
19Now all columns are non-zero since kouti > 0 for all i.
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where {
δj = 1, if k
out
j > 0
δj = 0, if k
out
j = 0
Therefore,
E[ACi ] = A
0
i + (1− h)θ E[
∑
j∈Bi
si←jδjA
C
j ], (62)
where the notation E[X] stands for the expectation of X. With the shares si←j defined as in equation (1) in the
main text, we have
E[ACi ] = A
0
i + (1− h)θ
∑
j∈Bi
P (kinj > 0)E[
ai←j
koutj
A
C
j ], (63)
with P (koutj = 0) is the probability that k
out
j = 0 and P (k
out
j > 0) is the probability that k
out
j > 0.
Under random graphs with a probability p of a link between any two nodes (i.e. P (ai←j = 1) = p), for every j
it is easy to show that P (koutj = 0) = P (k
in
j = 0) = (1−p)
(N−1) and P (koutj > 0) = P (k
in
j > 0) = 1−(1−p)
(N−1).
In addition, E[koutj ] = E[k
in
j ] = p(N − 1). That leads to
E[ACi ] = A
0
i + [1− (1− p)
(N−1)](1− h)θ
∑
j 6=i
E[P (ai←j = 1)
ai←j
koutj
A
C
j ]. (64)
From equation (64) we have20
E[ACi ] ≈ A
0
i + [1− (1− p)
(N−1)](1− h)θ
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
E[ACj ] (65)
and the following approximation21
E[
N∑
i=1
A
C
i ] ≈
∑N
i=1 A
0
i
1− [1− (1− p)(N−1)](1− h)θ
. (66)
Thus,
lim
p→1
E[
∑N
i=1 A
C
i ]∑N
i=1A
0
i
=
1
1− (1− h)θ
. (67)
Note that {
E[AC
out
i ] = P (k
out
i > 0)θ E[A
C
i ] = (1− (1− p)
(N−1))θE[ACi ]
E[A0
out
i ] = P (k
out
i > 0)θA
0
i = (1− (1− p)
(N−1))θA0i
(68)
Consequently,
E[
N∑
i=1
A
0out
i ] = [1− (1− p)
(N−1)]θ
N∑
i=1
A
0
i (69)
and
E[
N∑
i=1
A
Cout
i ] ≈
[1− (1− p)(N−1)]θ
∑N
i=1 A
0
i
1− [1− (1− p)(N−1)](1− h)θ
. (70)
Hence,
E[m] ≈
E[
∑N
i=1A
Cout
i ]
E[
∑N
i=1A
0out
i ]
=
1
1− [1− (1− p)(N−1)](1− h)θ
(71)
and
lim
p→1
E[
∑N
i=1A
Cout
i ]
E[
∑N
i=1A
0out
i ]
= lim
p→1
1
1− [1− (1− p)(N−1)](1− h)θ
=
1
1− (1− h)θ
. (72)
20We use the approximation E[XY ] ≈ E[X]E[Y ].
21We use the approximation E[X
Y
] ≈ E[X]
E[Y ]
.
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Moreover, we can easily show that the approximations for E[
∑N
i=1A
C
i ], E[
∑N
i=1A
0out
i ], and E[m] are increasing
functions of the network density p. In addition, given p in (0, 1], these measures are also increasing functions of
the size of the network, N .
We now proceed with proving the second part of the proposition. We consider a core-periphery graphs in
which: (i) the number of nodes in the core, Ncore, is fixed; (ii) each node in the periphery has only out-going
links, and all point to nodes in the core; (iii) each node in the core are also randomly connected to each other
with the probability pcore, and there are no directed links from the core to the periphery nodes.
To begin, we first consider the behavior of nodes in the periphery part (Per). For every node j in the periphery,
we have {
koutj ≥ 1
δj = 1
and {
AC
out
j = A
0out
j = θA
0
j
ACj = A
0
j
Therefore, ∑
j∈Per
A
Cout
j = θ
∑
j∈Per
A
0
j (73)
and ∑
j∈Per
A
C
j =
∑
j∈Per
A
0
j . (74)
Equations (73) and (74) imply that the aggregate amounts of in-flowing and out-going collateral of all nodes in
the periphery remain constant during rehypothecation process. This observation is intuitive since we assume that
periphery banks are purely borrowers and therefore they do not receive collateral from other banks.
Moving on to the core part, for every bank i in the core part (Core) we have
A
C
i = A
0
i + (1− h)θ
∑
j∈Per
si←jδjA
C
j + (1− h)θ
∑
j∈Core
si←jδjA
C
j . (75)
Taking the expectation from both sides, we have
E[ACi ] = A
0
i + (1− h)θ
∑
j∈Per
si←jA
0
j + (1− h)θ E[
∑
j∈Core
si←jδjA
C
j ]. (76)
Defining
A˜
0
i = A
0
i + (1− h)θ
∑
j∈Per
si←jA
0
j , (77)
then we have
E[ACi ] = A˜
0
i + (1− h)θ E[
∑
j∈Core
si←jδjA
C
j ]. (78)
Equations (77) and (75) respectively imply two important characteristics of the rehypothecation of collateral
under the considered core-periphery structure, i.e. the concentration into the core part and the reuse of collateral
among banks in the core.
In addition, since each non-zero column of the matrix of shares S = {si←j}NxN is summing to 1, it is easy
to show that ∑
i∈Core
A˜
0
i =
∑
i∈Core
A
0
i + (1− h)θ
∑
j∈Per
A
0
j . (79)
Since nodes in the core are assumed to be randomly connected with the density pcore, using the results
obtained from random graphs we have
E[
∑
i∈Core
A
C
i ] =
∑
i∈Core A˜
0
i
1− [1− (1− p)(Ncore−1)](1− h)θ
. (80)
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Equations (74) and (80) lead to
E[
N∑
i=1
A
C
i ] = E[
∑
i∈Per
A
C
i ] + E[
∑
i∈Core
A
C
i ] =
∑
i∈Per
A
0
j +
∑
i∈Core A˜
0
i
1− [1− (1− pcore)(Ncore−1)](1− h)θ
. (81)
Note that, for every node i in the core part{
E[AC
out
i ] = P (k
out
i > 0)θ E[A
C
i ] = [1− (1− pcore)
(Ncore−1)]θ E[ACi ]
E[A0
out
i ] = P (k
out
i > 0)θA
0
i = [1− (1− pcore)
(Ncore−1)]θA0i
(82)
Therefore
E[
∑
i∈Core
A
Cout
i ] =
[1− (1− pcore)
(Ncore−1)]θ
∑
i∈Core A˜
0
i
1− [1− (1− pcore)(Ncore−1)](1− h)θ
(83)
and
E[
∑
i∈Core
A
0out
i ] = [1− (1− pcore)
(Ncore−1)]θ
∑
i∈Core
A
0
i . (84)
From (73) and (83) we have
E[
N∑
i=1
A
Cout
i ] = E[
∑
j∈Per
A
Cout
j ] + E[
∑
i∈Core
A
Cout
i ] = θ
∑
j∈Per
A
0
j +
[1− (1− pcore)
(Ncore−1)]θ
∑
i∈Core A˜
0
i
1− [1− (1− pcore)(Ncore−1)](1− h)θ
, (85)
which can be simplified as
E[
N∑
i=1
A
Cout
i ] =
θ
∑
j∈PerA
0
j + [1− (1− pcore)
(Ncore−1)]θ
∑
i∈Core A
0
i
1− [1− (1− pcore)(Ncore−1)](1− h)θ
(86)
by substituting A˜0i in equation (79) into equation (85).
Moreover, the expectation of the aggregate amount of initial out-going collateral is
E[
N∑
i=1
A
0out
i ] = E[
∑
j∈Per
A
0out
j ] + E[
∑
i∈Core
A
0out
i ] = θ
∑
j∈Per
A
0
j + [1− (1− pcore)
(Ncore−1)]θ
∑
i∈Core
A
0
i . (87)
As results,
E[m] ≈
E[
∑N
i=1A
Cout
i ]
E[
∑N
i=1A
0out
i ]
=
1
1− [1− (1− pcore)(Ncore−1)](1− h)θ
(88)
and
lim
pcore→1
E[
∑N
i=1 A
Cout
i ]
E[
∑N
i=1A
0out
i ]
=
1
1− (1− h)θ
. (89)
Again, it can be shown that E[
∑N
i=1 A
C
i ], E[
∑N
i=1A
0out
i ] and the approximation for E[m] are increasing
functions of the density of the core pcore. In addition, these three measures are also increasing functions of the
size of the core part, Ncore, given pcore in (0, 1]. Comparing the multiplier estimated for core-periphery graphs,
as in equation (88) and with the one estimated for random graphs as in equation (71), we notice that the former
is always larger than the latter, as long as pcore > 1− (1− p)
N−1
Ncore−1 = pth, thus verifying the third part of the
proposition. Finally, by inspecting equations (72) and (89) we verify the fourth and final part of the proposition.
Proof of proposition 7.
We will now provide detailed derivations for the equilibrium existence to non-hoarded parameters determined
under the Value-at-Risk strategy. To begin, let us start with the following definitions:
Definition 1. For each column vectorX = [X1, X2, ..., XN−1, XN ]
T ∈ RN+ ,X ≥
1
(1−h)
C0 (where C0 = [c01, c
0
2, ..., c
0
N−1, c
0
N ]
T ),
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the elements of the matrix W˜VaR(X) (size NxN) is defined as
W˜
VaR
i←j =
(1−h)Xj−c
0
j
Xjk
out
j
, ∀i ∈ Lj 6= ∅
W˜VaRi←j = 0, elsewhere
(90)
We now show that the following system of equations
X = A0 + W˜VaR(X)X (91)
has a single unique solution if 0 < h < 1 and A˜−1b˜ ≥ C
0
1−h
, where b˜ is a column vector size Nx1, with
b˜ = A0 − SC0 (92)
and
A˜ = I − (1− h)S , (93)
with the matrix of shares, S , is defined as in equation (1) in the main text.
Notice that
X = A0 + W˜VaR(X)X
⇔
Xi = A
0
i +
∑
j 6=i
ai←j
koutj
[(1− h)Xj − c
0
j ],∀i = 1, 2, ...N (94)
⇔
A
0
i −
∑
j 6=i
ai←j
koutj
c
0
j = Xi −
∑
j 6=i
(1− h)ai←j
koutj
Xj ,∀i = 1, 2, ...N. (95)
Equivalently,
b˜ = A˜X. (96)
If A˜ is an invertible matrix, system (96) has a single unique solution
X = A˜−1b˜. (97)
We now show the invertibility of A˜ by reductio ad absurdum. Suppose that A˜ is not invertible, then det(A˜) = 0.
Note that A˜ = I − (1− h)S therefore det(A˜) = 0 if and only if 1
1−h
(> 1) is an eigenvalue of S . However, since
each non-zero column of S is summing to 1, according to Perron-Frobenius theorem, the largest eigenvalue of S
can not be larger than 1.
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